MY last two columns were on the Ukraine war firmly now in Trump’s court; and the state of his incoherence on ending seven wars in seven months. Today’s is an analysis on the Anchorage one-on-one meeting with Putin — a two-man show — one a failed dealmaker, the other a global mobster; followed three days later by a White House gathering with Zelenskyy and European allies which was incongruously hawked by MAGA as a diplomatic breakthrough: a triumph for Trump and a humiliation for Putin.
The reality tells a different narrative exposing deep strategic risks: a US president willing to normalize relations with a revanchist Russia, discussing territorial compromises for Ukraine — without even the participation of Zelenskyy. (This is analogous to America extorting the Philippine territories from Spain for $20 million, after Spain lost the Spanish-American war; without the participation of Philippine President Emilio Aguinaldo, precipitating the Filipino-American war. But this digression is a topic for another column).
The consequences reached well beyond Kyiv. Europe’s security posture is weakened, NATO cohesion is strained, and partners in East Asia have new reason to fear that the United States may be a more capricious guarantor of the international order than assumed.
What happened in Alaska was striking less for any concrete deliverables than for its symbolism. Putin received a highly publicized red carpet welcome at a US military base; the meeting produced upbeat public motherhood statements but no ceasefire, no binding commitments, and no substantive agreement to reverse Russia’s battlefield gains. In the follow-up session at the White House, Trump hosted Zelenskyy and European leaders to discuss “security guarantees” for Ukraine. Yet the outlines advanced publicly were vague: talk of “NATO Article5like” assurances without the definitive US commitments of boots-on-the-ground; and suggestions that territorial adjustments — a Russian-proposed land swap in Donetsk in exchange for small returns elsewhere — could be part of a peace framework.
Risks
I see several major risks stemming from this political theater. First, the summit’s optics and rhetoric rehabilitated Putin’s image and softened the stance on sanctions, effectively rewarding Russia for its aggression instead of punishing it. Putin was made to look like a “winner,” which weakens the West’s punitive leverage.
Second, offering security guarantees without credible enforcement and a willingness to deploy forces invites future aggression. These empty promises are seen as dangerous, and Trump has become an expert on this “forked tongue” approach that undermines deterrence.
Third, the consequences for Ukraine are seen as existential. Forcing Kyiv to negotiate while fighting is a form of negotiation “under the barrel of a gun.” A ceasefire must precede any durable settlement; otherwise, Moscow can consolidate gains and impose terms. Such a deal, based on vague security guarantees, risks turning Ukraine into a dependent state and could cause political fracture in Kyiv and instability within the country.
Finally, the diplomatic process that sidelined Ukraine in Anchorage also speaks to a broader problem: the marginalization of European voices in discussions about European security. The idea that the future of the continent could be discussed without the meaningful participation of the nations most directly affected is a dangerous reminder of an older style of great power bargaining — equivalent to the decision-making process in a proverbial “smoke-filled room.” The lack of a treaty at the Alaska meeting shows that US unilateral talks with Russia can disrupt transatlantic coordination, forcing European capitals to scramble to set their own red lines after the fact.
Repercussions in Asia
This dynamic has wider strategic repercussions in East Asia. Security in that region rests in part on a norms-based order that discourages conquest and coercion. If major powers observe that the United States can re-engage and “embrace” an aggressor without sustained costs, the deterrent effect of US commitments declines.
Beijing is likely to watch how US decision-making responds to personal diplomacy and flattery. The risk is not that China will immediately do a Ukraine on Taiwan, but that it will be more enticed to alter the status quo in the South China Sea if the perceived cost of doing so is lower. And the Philippines astride the West Philippine Sea which has relied on the primacy and psychological defense of the 2016 Hague arbitral ruling and America’s mutual defense assurances may for its own survival hedge or accommodate Beijing.
These summits have become transactional and driven by individual personalities, undermining stable, institutional policymaking. When national security decisions are filtered through an idiosyncratic leader who prizes deal-making, flattery and headline achievements, predictable, institutionally grounded policy gives way to episodic bargains.
Authoritarian leaders, like Putin and Xi who understand that calculus are masters at this game. For example, Putin’s praise of Trump’s false election claims demonstrates how such interactions can be used as propaganda. As I have always maintained, the puerile but cognitively impaired Donald is putty in the hands of Vlad. And Xi is following his lead.
Democratic initiatives
What should Western and Asian partners do in response? First, Europe must accelerate its own capability building and deeper integration so that it is less dependent on US posture for immediate deterrence. That means targeted investments in mobility, logistics, air defense, counter-drone technology, reserve systems and interoperable command structures.
It also means treating Ukraine as a strategic partner in a manner that goes beyond ad hoc aid: sustained arms transfers, training partnerships, and institutional ties that make the country more resilient irrespective of Washington’s short-term policy volatility. Trump’s demand for 5 percent increase on GDP for NATO defense spending could be a serendipitous decision.
Second, allies must clarify the meaning of any “security guarantees.” Vague, media-friendly phrases are insufficient. Guarantees must be accompanied by measurable commitments — basing, prepositioning, joint exercises, rapid reinforcement plans and possibly codified treaties — or they will be worthless as deterrents. NATO could threaten “boots on the ground” as Putin did with his North Korean allies.
Third, East Asian states should redouble regional cooperation and diversify deterrence. Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and Southeast Asian states may accelerate renewed investment in indigenous capabilities upgrades, supply chain diversification, and deeper intraregional security cooperation (e.g., QUAD, Aukus), making coercion costlier and less attractive for revisionist powers. Diplomatic coordination among democracies in Asia and Europe can also help preserve norms by collectively applying costs for territorial aggression.
Finally, Democratic states can enhance institutional mechanisms limiting the risk of abrupt changes in foreign policy disrupting collective security. Examples include US congressional oversight, though Trump has short-circuited the process; consultative procedures within NATO and the EU; and transparent multilateral decision-making, all of which may help ensure that consistent strategy takes precedence over episodic shifts in diplomacy.
The Alaska summit and similar diplomatic engagements that rely on symbolic meetings and ambiguous promises undermine global security by weakening deterrence and sidelining crucial stakeholders. This approach, suiting Trump’s DNA as a reality TV star, and Putin’s bullyboy persona, prioritizes optics over substance and risks leaving allies with unfavorable peace terms unless they reinforce their commitments.
The central message is that true peace and security depend on consistent policy and tangible strength. Not the appearance of hocus-pocus diplomacy.
